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NOTE
GRATUITOUS BAILOR'S LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSONS FOR
INJURIES CAUSED BY UNDISCOVERED DEFECTS
It is well-settled that a bailor for hire is under a duty to make a reasonable
inspection of the chattel for hidden defects1 and if either the baileL or a third
person is injured because of a defect which the bailor could have discovered in the
exercise of ordinary diligence, the bailor is liable to both.2 It is also clear that in
the case of a gratuitous bailment (for the sole benefit of the bailee), the gratuitous
bailor is under a duty to the bailee to disclose only defects which are known to the
ICONN v. HUNSBERGER, 224 Pa. 154; 73 A. 324; HARTFORD BATTERY SALES CORP. v. PRICE,
119 Pa. Super 165; 181 A. 95; WHITE Co. v. FRANCIS, 95 Pa. Super. 315; 8 C.J.S. 258; 68 A.L.R.
1002; 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 372; 6 Am. Jur. 286.2 BRANT v. ASARNOW, 7 N.J. Misc. 803; 147 A. 233; 61 A.L.R. 1336; 19 L.R.A, 283, 6 Am,
Jur. 288; 8 C.J.S. 258.
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bailor.3 In addition, it has been decided that a third person who shares the use of
the chattel with the bailee under such a gratuitous bailment has no greater rights
than bas the bailee. 4
These situations will not be discussed in this article. They are mentioned
above in order to show the limitations of the problem and to prevent the confus-
ion which is occasionally evident in the cases. 5
The scope of this paper is confined to the liability of a gratuitous bailor for
injuries to a third person, who is not associated with either the bailor or the bailee,
caused by defect in the bailed chattel unknown to the bailor, which defect could
have been ascertained by the bailor in the exercise of ordinary or reasonable dili-
gence. For example, suppose D lends his car to X, and unknown to D or X, the
car has defective brakes or a faulty steering apparatus. Because of such a defect,
X injures P, a pedestrian, who now sues D. Is D liable? The answer to this
interrogatory constitutes the range of this paper.
There is very little authority on the topic. As will be shown, in some cases
the point is merely discussed by the court as a dictum; in the few cases in which
the problem has squarely arisen, the courts often base their decisions on reasons
which are wholly inapplicable to the question here at issue.
The first case in which the precise problem arose was Donovan v. Garvas.6
In that case, D owned a taxicab which was operated by X. While X was on an
errand of his own (thus, a gratuitous bailment), he parked the taxi on a hill.
Because of defective brakes, the taxi coasted down the hill and killed P's intestate.
Held: D is liable to P. The decision seems to be based on the ground that the
owner has a statutory duty to provide adequate brakes, which duty is merely an
affirmance of a common law duty. To quote from the court:
"An automobilist is under the duty of equipping his machine
with proper brakes. This duty not only exists under common law
principles, but it is generally affirmed by statutory enactments. It is
the owner who is required to provide adequate brakes, and if he fails
in this duty through lack of inspection, or want of proper care, he
must be responsible for the consequences arising from his negligence.
"The defendant has been held liable, not for the negligence of his
employee, but for his own lack of proper care. An absolute duty was
8DICKASON v. DICKASON, 84 Mont. 52, 274 P. 145; 8 C.J.S. 261; 5 Am. Jur. 401, 698; 12
A.L.R. 766; 131 A.L.R. 855.4
RUTH v. HUTCHINSON GAS. Co., 209 Minn. 248, 296 N.W. 136 (1941); 25 Minn. L. Rev.
800; 6 Am. Jur. 401; 5 Am. Jur. 698; JOHNSON v. BULLARD CO., 95 Conn. 251, 111 A. 70 (1920).
This also applies to a servant of the bailee: GAGNON v. DANA, 69 N.H. 264, 39 A. 982
(1898); MACCARTHY V. YOUNG, 158 Eng. Reprint 136 (1861); 12 A.L.R. 794.
A person called by the bailee to his assistance likewise has no higher rights than the bailee:
BLAKEMORE v. BRISTOL & E. R. Co., 120 Eng. Reprint 385 (1858) ; 12 A.L.R. 795.
5
See: The Pegeen, (D.C., Cal.) 14 Fed. Supp. 748 (1936); FOSTER v. FARRA, 117 Ore. 286,
243 P. 778 (1926) ; BOGART v. COHEN-ANDERSON MOTOR CO. (Ore.), 98 P. 2nd 720 (1940).
6200 N.Y.S. 253 (1923).
7117 Ore. 286, 24) P, 778 (1926).
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Elaced upon the defendant to see that his car was equipped with proper
akes, and when he negligently omitted to perform this duty, and
turned loose upon the public streets an instrument of death, he ought
to be held liable for the results caused by his failure to obey the law."
It seems doubtful that the liability of the gratuitous bailor of an automobile
would be extended to other chattels, if the reasoning of this Donovan Case is fol-
lowed, unless the other chattel also had the element of public policy involved in
its use. This question is, of course, completely unsettled.
The next case in which the problem arose was Foster v. Farra. In this case,
D loaned his car to his son, X, who injured P, because of defective brakes and
negligence. It is not clear whether D knew of the defective brakes. In a suit by
P against D, it was held that D is liable. As in the Donovan Case, supra, the lia-
bility is based on a statute requiring brakes to be in good condition. Similarly,
the automobile is condemned as a dangerous instrumentality.
The court then bases the liability on the so-called "Family Purpose Doctrine."
It would seem, however, that this doctrine only applied to the son's negligence.
The case is mainly valuable in that it throws some light on the drift of the courts
toward the imposition of liability on the gratuitous bailor.
The case of Bolin v. Corliss Co.s was the next to arise. Here, D company
gratuitously loaned its car to X. While driving, a rim and tire came off and in-
jured P, a pedestrian on the sidewalk. It was found that D. would have had to re-
move the rim to discover the defect which caused the injury. In a suit by P. against
D, it was held that D was not liable. The court based its conclusion on the fact
that the defect would not have been disclosed by the exercise of ordinary diligence.
As may be seen in the following quotation from the opinion, the court, on the
basis of an assumption, implies that D would have been liable if the defect had
been ascertainable through a reasonable inspection:
"There was ...no evidence to support th'e plaintiff's conten-
tion that at that time the rim or tire was defective, or, even if it were
defective, that a reasonable inspection would have disclosed its condi-
tion. Assuming that the defendant would be liable in permitting (the
bailee) to use a defective automobile when it knew of the defect or,
as a reasonably prudent person, could have discovered it, the plaintiff
did not show that the defendant possessed such knowledge or that the
defect, if it then existed, might have reasonably been discovered."
The next case to arise was the English case of Chapman or Oliver v. Saddler
& Co.9 The facts are as follows: D company was a firm of stevedores engaged in
lifting bags of grain from the hold of a ship to its deck. In so doing, D attached
slings around the bags. D's duty ended with the deposit of the bags on the deck,
from which they were transported by a porterage company to the dock. The
8262 Mass. 115, 159 N.E. 612 (1928).
9A.C. 584-H.L. (1929). On this case see also the note in 131 A.L.R. 857.
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gratuitous bailment arose when D allowed the porterage company to use the same
slings without charge. A sling broke and the falling of a bag killed plaintiff's
intestate, a servant of the porterage company. It was held that D company was
liable, but the case is decided on its special circumstances. The court says:
"It is in the interests of everyone concerned in the expeditious
discharge of the cargo that these operations should be continuous.
These circumstances did disclose a duty cast on the (defendants) to
take proper steps to see that the ropes were safe. The duty continued
towards the men who were concerned in the second part of the opera-
tion."
Thus, the court strictly limits the case to its facts. It is interesting to note
that the four members of the House of Lords who listened to the case wrote three
separate, concurring opinions, and they admitted that there was no precedent for
the holding.g(a)
In the same year that this English case was decided, a case arose in New Jer-
sey, Hinsch v. Amirkanian,10 which was somewhat similar to Donovan v. Garvas,"
supra, on its facts. In this case, D loaned his car to X (it seems). Because of faulty
brakes, the P's intestate was killed by the car. Held: D is liable. The decision is
not based on a statute. However, there is nothing in the case as reported from
which it can be ascertained whether D knew the brakes were defective. The court
says:
these facts . . . were sufficient to justify an inference of
negligence."
The facts in The Pegeen12 are not quite in point but some dicta by the court
are interesting. In this case Ds gratuitously bailed their motor cruiser to X. The boat
seemed to be in excellent condition, D having recently overhauled it. While X
,has on a short trip with eight guests, the boat exploded, for some unknown rea-
son, injuring the guests, who now sue Ds. It was held that Ds were not liable.
But the court seems to imply that Ds would be liable if the cause of the explosion
had been the unseaworthiness of the boat. (Under the statement of facts, the ex-
plosion could have resulted from the negligence of one of the guests as well as
from a defect in the boat). The court says:
"The petitioners (Ds) are entitled to exoneration from liability
because of the absence of any evidence that the injuries were caused
by any defect in the vessel or its equipmnt known to them or which
an inspection might have disclosed."
9(A). For an American case involving the same principle see: MCGLONE V. ANGUS, INC.,
248 N.Y. 197; 161 N.E. 469 (1928).
10104 N.J.L. 260, 145 A. 232 (1929).
1lSee footnote 6..
12(D.C., Cal.) 14 Fed. Supp. 748 (1936).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In Sturtevant et al v. Pagel et ux,13 D gratuitously loaned his car to his son
S. The brakes were defective. This was not known to D, but may have been
known to S (the opinion is not clear). S allowed X to drive the car. Because of
the defective brakes, P's intestate was killed. Suit is brought against D, S, and X.
Held: D and X are liable. The court bases the liability of D on a duty to use
reasonable care in inspecting the car before it is loaned. The opinion states:
"If the owner of the car knows, or should know by the use of
ordinary diligence, that the brakes on his car are in bad working
order, and are inadequate to stop and control the speed of the car,
and he permits another to use such car upon the public highways and
streets, he would be liable for all damages resulting from the use of
such car due to the inadequacy of the brakes.
". . . (D) ... knew, or should'have known by the use of reason-
able diligence that the brakes on the car were in bad working order."
In an appeal on this same case by D,11 in which D claims he did not know of
the defective brakes, D's liability is affirmed on the theory that, even though he
did not know the brakes were defective, his son knew this fact, and this is imputed
to D on agency principles. It is difficult for this writer to see how any theory of
agency could be applied here, because the car was used by the son on the son's
own business. In addition, the court itself says that the "Family Purpose Doctrine"
is not applicable in Texas. The court would have been more accurate if it had
admitted that there was a duty on D's part to make an antecedent 'xamination, as
did the court in the Donovan Case.15
Another case showing the trend toward recognition of the duty to make a
reasonable inspection is Bogart v. Cohen-Anderson Motor Co. 16 The facts in this
case are not in point, since the gratuitous bailor is being sued by a companion of
the bailee for injuries because of the defect, but a dictum of the court is relevant:
... (the gratuitous bailor) must use ordinary care to see that
it (the car) is in. a reasonably safe condition to use on the public high-
ways. The failure to comply with this legal duty or obligation makes
the bailor liable to third persons if the injury is the proximate result of
such negligence." But the court further states: "... .there is no sub-
stantial evidence tending to show that D knew or ought to have known
that the brakes were in a dangerous condition."
In other words, in this case, the court would have held the gratuitous bailor
liable even t0 the companion of the gratuitous bailee if the defect could have been
discovered by the exercise of ordinary dilignce. In addition, this dictum also seems
to imply that the defect can be other than bad brakes (although such was the fact
in this case).
13(Texas) 109 S.W. 2nd 556 (1937).




16(Ore.) 98 P. 2nd 720 (1940).
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To summarize the results of the cases: It seems clear that the gratuitous bailor
of an automobile is under a greater duty to an innocent third person than he is to
the gratuitous bailee, at least as far as defective brakes are concerned. The cases
show a strong trend toward requiring the bailor to make a reasonable inspection of
the brakes before the gratuitous bailment is made, and if the brakes are found to
be defective, there may be a duty to repair them.
It would logically seem that this duty should be extended to other defects in
automobiles, such as defective steering wheels, deficient lights, faulty horns, etc.
It is at least debatable whether the duty should be extended to bailments of chattels
other than automobiles. A dictum shows that it might be applied to the loan of a
boat. If the duty is rightfully based on public policy, it would certainly seem to
follow that it should be expanded to the gratuitous bailment of an airplane as well.
Although the rule may be harsh in its effect on the bailor, it seems to this
writer that, of the two innocent persons involved, the bailor is slightly less innocent,
in that he alone has the opportunity to inspect the chattel for defects.
E. E. LUPPINCOTT, II
